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I. INTRODUCTION
Following the United States refusal to participate in the Nicaragua
case,' and its subsequent withdrawal from the so-called "optional clause,",
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1. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14 (June 27); Statement on the United States Withdrawal from the Proceedings Initiated by
Nicaragua in the International Court of Justice, 85 DEP'T ST. BULL. 64 (1985).
2. For the text of the United States August 26, 1946 declaration, see Declaration on the Part
of the United States of America, Aug. 26, 1946, 61 Stat. 1218; United States Declaration
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a great deal of pessimism surrounded the future of the International Court
of Justice.3 Less than a decade later, and only half way through the decade
of international law, it would appear, to paraphrase Mark Twain, that
reports of the court's demise were greatly exaggerated.' Recent literature
on the court, and on international law in general, shows a renewed
optimism about international adjudication, often bordering on the
idealistic. Some authors express a renewed interest in the compulsory
jurisdiction of the court and others simply discuss the bright future of the
court in a world ruled by international law.'
Recognizing Jurisdiction, 1983-1984 I.C.J.Y.B. 90-91 (1984). For the notice terminating United
States declaration see United States: Department of State Letter and Statement Concerning
Termination of Acceptance of I.C.J. Compulsory Jurisdiction, 24 I.L.M. 1742-45 (1985); see
also Declarations Recognizing as Compulsory the Jurisdiction of the Court, 1985-1986
I.C.J.Y.B. 60 (1986); U.S. Terminates Acceptance of .C.J. Compulsory Jurisdiction, 86 DEP'T.
ST. BULL. 67 (1986).
3. Anthony Guistini, Compulsory Adjudication in International Law: The Past, The
Present, and Prospects for the Future, 9 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 213 (1986). For a discussion of
both optimistic and pessimistic views on the United States reacceptance of compulsory
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, see Jeffrey P. Bialos ET AL., Should the United
States Reconsider Its Acceptance of World Court Jurisdiction?, 79 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 95
(1985).
4. Mood swings by the World Court are not a new phenomenon. More than 20 years ago
William D. Coplin and J. Martin Rochester noted, "Both optimism and pessimism about the role
of international institutions have been voiced during the past fifty years, with pessimism
predominating over the long run." William D. Coplin & J. Martin Rochester, The Permanent
Court of International Justice, the International Court of Justice, the League of Nations, and the
United Nations: A Comparative Empirical Survey, 66 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 529 (1972); see also
William D. Coplin, Current Studies of the Functions of International Law: Assessments and
Suggestions, in 2 POL. SCI. ANN. 149 (1970). Similar sentiments have been expressed more
recently by Thomas M. Frank and Jerome M. Lehrman, who characterized the United States
commitment toward international adjudication as "the product of an inconclusive struggle
between two contradictory national tendencies: the messianic and the chauvinist." Thomas M.
Frank & Jerome M. Lehrman, Messianism and Chauvinism in America's Commitment to Peace
Through Law, in THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT THE CROSSROADS 3, 6 (L.
Damrosch ed., 1987).
5. See, e.g., Robert Y. Jennings, The International Court of Justice after Fifty Years, 89
AM. J. INT'L L. 493 (1995); Keith Highet, The Peace Palace Heats Up: The World Court in
Business Again?, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 646 (1991); Peter H. F. Bekker, Correspondence, 87 AM.
J. INT'L L. 429 (1993); Martin A. Rogoff, International Politics and the Rule of Law: The
United States and the International Court of Justice, 7 B.U. INT'L L.J., 267-99 (1989); Geoffrey
R. Watson, Constitutionalism, Judicial Review, and the World Court, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1-45
(1993); Jose Maria Ruda, Some of the Contributions of the International Court of Justice to the
Development of International Law, 24 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 35-68 (1991); Jonathan
Charney, Progress in International Maritime Boundary Delimitation Law, 88 AM. J. INT'L L.
227-56 (1994); Edward McWhinney, Acceptance, Withdrawal or Denial of World Court
Jurisdiction: Some Recent Trends as to Jurisdiction, 20 ISR. L. REV. 148-66 (1985); Anthony
D'Amato, The United States Should Accept, by a New Declaration, the General Compulsory
Jurisdiction of the World Court, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 331 (1986); Anthony D'Amato, Modifying
U.S. Acceptance of the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the World Court, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 385
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What is the reason for this dramatic turn around in views about the
court? Much of the current literature seems generated in response to the
sudden flood of cases brought before the court in the past few years.: The
apparent willingness of states to resort to the International Court of Justice
[hereinafter I.C.J.] in recent times has buoyed hope on the part of its
proponents and, at least temporarily, given silence to its detractors. This
is, perhaps, a natural outcome of the swing from a period of low court
business and a high level of defiance against the court, to a period of high
business and little or no defiance.
However, lest we be caught up in positing long-term trends from
short-term events, we should give some perspective to the current I.C.J.
activity. Periods of high activity for the World Court are not new. Both
the Permanent Court of International Justice [hereinafter P.C.I.J.] and the
I.C.J. demonstrated extremely active periods in their early years. Not
unlike the contemporary period, these two periods of high activity on the
court also were accompanied by optimistic literature regarding
international adjudication.' In each instance, though, these periods of high
court activity were followed by a decline in the court's business and, in the
case of the I.C.J., a period of troublesome defiance by states brought
before the court under its optional compulsory jurisdiction clause., In
order to assess whether this recent period of high activity indicates a more
(1985); Louis B. Sohn, Suggestions for the Limited Acceptance of Compulsory Jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice by the United States, 18 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1 (1988); Fred
L. Morrison, Reconsidering United States Acceptance of the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice, 148 WORLD AFF. 63 (1985); Richard Gardner, U.S. Termination
of the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, 24 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 421 (1986); J. Patrick Kelly, The International Court of Justice: Crisis and Reformation, 12
YALE J. INT'L L. 342 (1987); Robert E. Lutz, The World Court in a Changing World: An
Agenda for Expanding the Court's Role from a U.S. Perspective, 27 STAN. J. INT'L L. 265-343
(1991); Keith Wier, The International Court of Justice: Is it Time for a Change?, 8 HOUS. J.
INT'L L. 175 (1985); Douglas Ende, Reaccepting the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice: A Proposal for a New United States Declaration, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1145
(1986); Valerie Epps, Reinstating the United States Acceptance of the Compulsory Jurisdiction of
the International Court of Justice, 34 BOSTON BAR J. 8 (Jan./Feb. 1990).
6. See, e.g., Highet, supra note 5.
7. For literature on international jurisdiction, see Manley 0. Hudson's annual reports on
the work of the court contained in volumes of the American Journal of International Law
covering 1923-1959; see, e.g., Manley 0. Hudson, The Eleventh Year of the Permanent Court of
International Justice, 27 AM. J. INT'L L. 11 (1933); Manley 0. Hudson, The Twenty-Second
Year of the Permanent Court of International Justice, 44 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1950). See also,
e.g., SIR HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE
PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE (1934); SIR HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT (1958).
8. Gary L. Scott & Craig L. Car', The L C.J. and Compulsory Jurisdiction: The Case for
Closing the Clause, 81 AM. I. INT'L L. 57 (1987).
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long-lasting trend, or just another cycle in the history of the court, we
must determine what factors accompanying this recent phase might
indicate a more permanent turn by states toward peaceful dispute
settlement by adjudication.
The purpose of this article is to analyze the recent court activity in
the context of the entire history of the World Court, for the purpose of
placing it in broader political perspective. From this vantage point we
hope to assess the future prospects for continued reliance on the court by
disputant states and also to determine if the current business before the
court gives any rise in hope for prospects of greater acceptance of the role
of compulsory jurisdiction.
II. THE ASCENDANCY OF LEGALISM
It has been frequently noted, though not always to great effect, that
any legal system must be reflective of the political system which gives it
birth. This is true of international law just as it is for domestic law.9
Because of this, any increased reliance on international law, and by
extension, the World Court, must be accompanied by a political
atmosphere which allows states to be willing to conceptualize their disputes
as legal disputes and to allow third party adjudication of those disputes.
Without such an atmosphere, any attempt to impose legal solutions on
states without their consent will be doomed to failure. Any attempt to fix
the Court or to push it beyond the tolerances of the political system will
only create an illusion of lawfulness, surely to be shattered the moment
international adjudication runs afoul of the realities of the international
political system.
It has been suggested that the normal political atmosphere of the
international system is far from conducive to the promotion of international
adjudication. 0  Thus, it takes an extra incentive for states to turn to
international adjudication, rather than self-reliance, for the settlement of
disputes. The aftermath of periods of high international instability, like
those created by wars, seem to have provided just such an incentive.
9. As Martin A. Rogoff has noted, "International law and international institutions, like
domestic law and domestic institutions, require political support for their efficacy." Martin A.
Rogoff, International Politics and the Rule of Law: The United States and the International
Court of Justice, 7 B.U. INT'L L.J. 267, 291 (1989). See also Scott & Carr, supra note 8; Gary
L. Scott & Craig L. Carr, The International Court of Justice and the Treaty/Custom Dichotomy,
16 TEX. INT'L L.J. 347, 354-59 (1981).
10. Gary L. Scott & Karen D. Csajko, Compulsory Jurisdiction and Defiance in the World
Court: A Comparison of the P.C.I.J. and the I.C.J., 16 DENY. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 377-87
passim (1988).
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Unfortunately, in the past these peaks of international legal ascendancy
have been all too easily eroded as memories of past conflagrations dim.
The two world wars were each followed by a period of legal
idealism that we earlier termed "post-war legal euphoria."" It is not
surprising that during each of these periods the business of the court was at
its peak.12 In the short time since the end of the Cold War, the I.C.J. has
also been beset with an influx of cases which approximates the numbers
before the court at the end of each of the two world wars. There seems
little doubt that in the period following the end of the Cold War, legal
scholars and states alike found renewed interest in international
adjudication. This is hardly surprising since the Cold War was probably
as disruptive to the functioning of the international system as either of the
two previous wars, and its end just as naturally gave rise to hope for the
rule of law as did the two preceding hot wars.
While recognizing that the end of the Cold War is a significantly
different event from the end of the two global conflagrations, there is some
reason to think that it has had a similar effect on the thinking of statesmen
and scholars alike toward international law. As Anne-Marie Slaughter
Burley noted, "The resurgence of rules and procedures in the service of an
organized international order is the legacy of all wars, hot or cold."
There are, of course, important differences between the ends of
the two world wars and the end of the Cold War. Perhaps the most
important distinction, for the purpose of relating it to our analytic
framework, is that the ends of the two world wars can be tied to specific
dates: November 11, 1918, the signing of the German Armistice ending
World War 1, and August 15, 1945, the date of the Japanese surrender
ending World War II. Fixing a date for the end of the Cold War is
somewhat more problematic.
The breakup of the Soviet Union by 1992" brought the obvious
final chapter of the Cold War's end, but the demise of the Cold War really
preceded that by some considerable time. On November 20, 1990,
President George Bush announced, "The Cold War is over."'" The earlier
mid-1990 summit between Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and
11. Id. at 386.
12. Id. at 387.
13. Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Relations Theory: A
DualAgenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 205, 205 (1993).
14. Fred Hiatt, Minsk is No Moscow, and That's the Point for New Grouping, WASH.
POST, Dec. 9. 1991, at A16.
15. R.W. Apple, Jr., 34 Leaders Adopt Pact Proclaiming a United Europe, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 22, 1990, at AI.
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President Bush probably provided the impetus for Bush's remark. The
crumbling of the Berlin wall, long a symbol of the Cold War, came earlier
on November 9, 1989.11 Even prior to that came the ascendancy of Soviet
President Gorbachev "whose 'new thinking' essentially discarded the old
rules of the Cold War game."" Perestroika and Glasnost, Gorbachev's
new reform programs were formally announced on February 25, 1986,"1
and probably formed the basis for the eventual end of Cold War
international politics.
There is yet another important difference that distinguishes legal
activity following the ends of the two world wars and the end of the Cold
War. We might call that differenci lead-in time. Prior to the ends of the
two world wars, at a time when it was clear that each war was reaching its
conclusion and also clear who the victors would be, the victors began
planning for the pursuit of peaceful and lawful activities in the post-war
period. For example, at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in October
1944, the United States, Great Britain, China, and the Soviet Union
prepared a basic draft of the United Nations Organization 9 based on
agreements made earlier at the Moscow and Tehran Conference of 1943.20
In other words, the post-war effects on the thinking of political and legal
practitioners can be seen, at least in the planning stages, prior to the actual
end of the war. Such a phenomenon also happened at the end of the Cold
War. One can see both scholars' writings and practitioners' plans for the
end of the Cold War preceding the actual end of the Cold War, whichever
date one prefers to count as its actual end. The Intermediate Nuclear
Forces Treaty2' between the Soviet Union and the United States in
December 1987, is but one of these plans. The basic difference is that at
the ends of the two world wars states could only plan for the end of the
war while actual activity, like the formation of the United Nations or the
creation of the Court, had to await the cessation of hostilities.
16. Ferdinand Protzman, East Berliners Explore Land Long Forbidden, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
10, 1989, at Al.
17. MEL GURTOV, GLOBAL POLITICS IN THE HUMAN INTEREST 2, 3 (2d ed, 1991).
Gorbachev was appointed General Secretary of the CPSU in March 1985.
18. Mikhail Gorbachev, The Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th
Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, IZVESTIIA, Feb. 26, 1986, at 2-10 in 38
THE CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS No. 8, at 4.
19. GEORG SCHILD, BRETrON WOODS AND DUMBARTON OAKS 168-72 (1995).
20. Id. at 42-47; 2 LESTER BRUNE, CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF UNITED STATES
FOREIGN RELATIONS 823 (1985).
21. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on the Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, Dec. 8,
1987, U.S.-U.S.S.R., DEP'T ST. PUBLICATION 9555 (1987).
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However, unlike the ends of the two world wars, the absence of
open warfare between the major participants in the Cold War allowed
states to begin actions that could proceed apace while the Cold War
diminished and eventually ended. Moreover, states could take immediate
advantage of the court, even as the Cold War waned, because it was
already in place, requiring no start-up time as it had at the ends of the two
world wars. Thus, it seems reasonable to argue that increasing confidence
in international law and increasing reliance on the I.C.J. as a dispute
settlement mechanism may have been sparked by the anticipated, but
nonetheless obvious, ending of the Cold War. For purposes of this
analysis then, we have chosen 1986 as the beginning of the current phase
of I.C.J. activity.
III. THE P.C.I.J. AND THE I.C.J. IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
There are distinct similarities in the early years of the P.C.I.J. and
the I.C.J. regarding state behavior toward the court. During the period
following the two world wars when legal optimism abounded, each court
was extremely active. For the P.C.I.J., this period was the busiest of its
short existence. For the I.C.J., this period was unsurpassed until the
recent spate of litigation before the court.
Each court similarly experienced a decline in activity during its
second decade. For both courts, the decline in activity was tied to an
increase in international tensions. The decline in activity for the P.C.I.J.
seems to be tied to the major international financial crisis begun in 1929,
and the rise of National Socialist Germany after 1933.22 The I.C.J.'s
decline in activity seems tied to the intensification of the Cold War and the
proliferation of new states following the period of rapid decolonization.
The major emphasis on the Cold War probably disinclined states to
conceptualize their disputes as legal disputes. The proliferation of new
states, mostly former colonies, might also have had a dampening effect on
the court's activities, because during this period the court was still
dominated by Western state judges before whom the new states may have
been reluctant to appear.
Beyond the initial surge of litigation before both courts and its
subsequent decline following increased international hostilities, the
similarities in the life cycles of the two courts end. Quite simply put, the
life of the P.C.I.J., for all practical purposes, lasted only twenty years
while the I.C.J. is celebrating its fiftieth anniversary. The activity of the
P.C.I.J. was ended by the onset of World War II, while the I.C.J. was
22. Scott & Csajko, supra note 10, at 387.
Scott
8 ILSA Journal of Int'l & Comparative Law [Vol. 3:1
able to continue into its next phase. Unfortunately for the I.C.J., this next
phase proved to be its darkest period thus far. The decade of the 1960's
saw very few cases brought before the court, but beginning in the early
1970's and continuing through the mid-1980's there was a period of
serious defiance of the court.23
A. P.C.LJ. land LC.J. L
In roughly equivalent historical periods, one can compare patterns
of submissions to the World Court following each of the two world wars.
We shall call these periods P.C.I.J. I and I.C.J. I. These time periods
represent the busiest periods in the courts' schedules until the
contemporary period. During P.C.I.J. I (1923 through 1936) there were
twenty-seven contentious cases submitted to the P.C.I.J. There were also
twenty-eight cases submitted for advisory opinion. During a similar period
in the life of the I.C.J. (I.C.J. I, 1946 through 1962), thirty-one
contentious cases were submitted to the court. There were also twelve
submissions for advisory opinion during this period.
The patterns of these early submissions to both courts seem largely
to reflect a genuine interest in managing conflict through international
adjudication. With the exception of several political submissions to the
23.- The following are cases of defiance recorded during the period under consideration:
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3 (May 24);
Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.; N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253, 457 (Dec. 20); Fisheries Jurisdiction
(U.K. v. Ice.; F.R.G. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 3, 175 (July 25). Arguably, two other instances of
minor defiance occurred during this period. In Trial of Pakistani Prisoners of War (Pak. v.
India), 1973 I.C.J. 347 (Dec. 15), India refused to appear, though it did communicate with the
Court throughout the proceedings until Pakistan decided to have the proceedings discontinued. In
Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turk.), 1978 I.C.J. 3 (Dec. 19), Turkey refused to
appear in the initial phase of the case, but since the court found in Turkey's favor on the
preliminary objections, no further defiance was forthcoming.
As Scott has noted elsewhere, "Itihe instances of defiance of the Court are well
documented and have been given a great deal of scholarly attention." See H.W.A. THIRLWAY,
NON-APPEARANCE BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUsTICE 3-20 (1985). See also
Keith Highet, Litigation Implications of the U.S. Withdrawal from the Nicaragua Case, 79 AM.
1. INT'L L. 992 (1985). There is some disagreement regarding what constitutes defiance and
what should be regarded as normal behavior provided for in the statute. THIRLWAY, supra, note
23, at 1-20. Rather than debate the merits of the various perspectives, we will classify defiance as
any behavior where a state is legally bound to the court's jurisdiction but disregards the orders of
the court in a willful manner. Thus, judgments about states' attitudes, as seen in their responses
to the court, become an important criterion for our determination. Our definition of defiance
includes both non-appearance and non-performance. Albania's non-payment of the damages
assessed in the Corfu Channel case is an example of the former; France's behavior in the nuclear
test cases is an example of the latter, and the United States behavior in the Nicaragua case,
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14
(June 27), is an example of both willful non-appearance and non-performance. Scott & Csajko,
supra note 10, at 377 n.2.
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I.C.J. by the United States against the Soviet Union and other Communist
states, all submissions seem genuinely for the purpose of reaching a legal
settlement. 4 During P.C.I.J. I there were three cases submitted under the
optional clause 21 in which there were no preliminary objections by the
respondent state"l and there were ten joint submissions.2 Each of these
types of submissions indicates a willingness on the part of both parties to
come to a legal resolution of the problem. There were no instances of
defiance of the court in P.C.I.J. I.
The pattern of submissions in I.C.J. I is similar. There were four
cases submitted under the optional clause with no preliminary objections"
24. For a discussion of various types of submissions, both political and legal, see Scott &
Csajko, supra note 10, at 389-91. Scott & Csajko categorize submissions to the court into legal
submissions and political submissions. Legal submissions are divided into adjudicatory
submissions and bargaining submissions, depending on the desired outcome by the parties.
Political submissions are further subdivided into symbolic submissions, wherein the state tries to
enlist the symbolism of the court against another state, and leverage submissions, wherein the
submittingstate tries to enlist the court as an ally against the respondent.
The cases in which the United States used the court for political leverage against the
Warsaw Pact states are as follows: Treatment in Hungary of Aircraft and Crew of U.S.A. (U.S.
v. Hung.; U. S. v. U.S.S.R.), 1954 I.C.J. 99 (July 12); Aerial Incident of 10 Mar. 1953 (U.S. v.
Czech.), 1956 I.C.J. 6 (Mar. 14); Aerial Incident of 7 Oct. 1952 (U.S. v. U.S.S.R.), 1956 I.C.1.
9 (Mar. 14); Aerial Incident of 7Nov. 1954 (U.S. v. U.S.S.R.), 1959 I.C.J. 276 (Oct. 7).
25. The three cases were Memorial of Denmark, Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den.
v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. C) No. 62 (Oct. 31, 1931); Legal Status of the South-Eastern
Territory of Greenland (Nor. v. Den.; Den. v. Nor.), 1932 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 48 (Aug. 2);
and Appeal from Czechoslovak-Hungarian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal (The Royal Hungarian Peter
Pazmany University) (Czech. v. Hung.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (set. A/B) No. 61 (Dec. 15).
26. Supra note 25. See our discussion of these types of submissions which we call
Category I submissions, infra at 9.
27. Interpretation of Article 179, Annex Paragraph 4, of the Treaty of Neuilly (Bulg. &
Greece), 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 3 (Sept. 12); SS Lotus (Fr. & Turk.), 927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A)
No. 10 (Sept. 7); Payment of Various Serbian Loans Issued in France (Fr. & the Serb-Croat-
Solvene State), 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) Nos. 20/21 (July 12); Payment in Gold of Brazilian
Federal Loans Issued in France (Braz. & Fr.), 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) Nos. 20/21 (July 12);
Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Commission of the River Oder (Czech., Den., Fr.,
Ger., Gr. Brit., Swed., & Pol.), 1929 P.C.I.J. (set. A) No. 23 (Sept, 10); The Free Zones of
Upper Savoy and the District of Gex (Fr. & Switz.), 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 22 (Aug. 19);
Delimitation of the Territorial Waters between Casteltorizo and Anatolia (Italy & Turk.), 1933
P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 51 (Jan. 26); Lighthouse Case between France and Greece (Fr. &
Greece), 1934 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 62 (Mar. 17); Oscar Chinn (BeIg. & Gr. Brit.), 1934
P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 63 (Dec. 12); Lighthouse in Crete & Samos (Fr. & Greece), 1936
P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No.71 (Oct. 8).
28. See Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116 (Dec. 18); Rights of Nationals of the
United States of America in Morocco (Fr. v. U.S.), 1952 I.C.J. 176 (Aug. 27); Application of
the Convention of 1902 Governing the Guardianship of Infants (Swed. v. Neth.), 1958 I.C.J. 55
(Nov. 28); Arbitral Award Made by the King of Spain on 23 Dec. 1906 (Hond. v. Nicar.), 1960
I.C.J. 192 (Nov. 18).
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and six joint submissions.'9 With the arguable exception of Albania's
refusal to pay damages in the Corfu Channel case,3 0 there were no
instances of defiance during I.C.J. I, thus matching the record of
compliance of P.C.I.J. I.
Both P.C.I.J. I and I.C.J. I reflect the willingness of states in the
post-war periods to have their conflicts settled by third party adjudication.
As will be shown in the discussion below of I.C.J. III, there are many
similarities in both the types of submissions and the lack of defiance of the
court exhibited during the contemporary post-cold war period.
B. P.C.I.J. H and l.C.J. II
In the periods immediately following these rather busy times, both
the P.C.I.J. and the I.C.J. experienced a rather dramatic decline in the
number of cases submitted. We shall refer to these two periods as P.C.I.J.
II and I.C.J. II. From 1937 until the P.C.I.J.'s demise at the creation of
the I.C.J.,1' only seven contentious cases and no advisory requests were
submitted to the court. This was, quite obviously, because of the outbreak
of World War II. Interestingly, however, during I.C.J. II there was a
similar decline in the number of submissions, probably explained by the
intensification of cold war hostilities. In many ways the decline during
I.C.J. II was even more dramatic than during P.C.I.J. II. During the
period from 1963 through 1985, there were only twelve submissions of
contentious cases to the I.C.J. and six submissions for advisory opinion.
Moreover, several of these cases resulted in outright defiance of the
court's compulsory jurisdiction. 2
Though there are similarities in the second phases of both Courts,
perhaps the differences in these periods are more important. The P.C.I.J.
was obviously unable to operate during the open hostilities of World War
29. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. AIb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9); Asylum (Colom. v. Peru), 1950
I.C.J. 266 (Nov. 20); Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of November 20th, 1950, in the
Asylum (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 395 (Nov. 27); Haya De La Torre (Colom. v. Peru), 1951
I.C.J. 71 (June 13); Minquiers and Ecrehos (Fr. v. U.K.), 1953 I.C.J. 47 (Nov. 17); Sovereignty
Over Certain Frontier Lands (Belg. v. Neth.), 1959 l.C.J. 209 (June 20). Note that the number of
joint submissions is somewhat misleading because three of the cases involve essentially the same
incident between Columbia and Peru.
1 30. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. AIb.), 1949 I.C.J. 244 (Dec. 15). For discussion indicating
that this might not accurately be described as defiance of the court see, e.g., THIRLWAY, see fn
23, at 6-7; GENEVIEVE GUYOMAR, LE D9FAUT DES PARTIES A UN DIFF9REND DEVANT
JURISDICTIONS INTERNATIONALE 30, 201-3 (1960), cited in Highet, supra note 23, at 994.
31. Declaration Recognizing as Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice under art. 36, para. 2 of the Statute of the Court, U.N. Doc. STILEG/SER.E8, U.N.
Sales No. E.90.V.6. (1990).
32. Scott & Csajko, supra note 10, at 377 n.2.
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II and the decline in the court's business foreshadowed, only shortly, the
outbreak of fighting in Europe. In fact, it is rather amazing that in 1937
and 1938 there were actually two cases submitted to the court each year
"despite the fact that Germany had invaded and annexed Austria by March
1938.' Moreover, in spite of troubling times on the European continent,
there were no instances of defiance of the court during P.C.I.J. 1I."
During .C.J. II, a significantly longer period than P.C.I.J. II, the
court averaged only one case for every two years. The period from 1963
through 1970 saw the most startling decline in the court's business. Only
one case was submitted, that in 1967, following a four-year hiatus in
submissions and preceding another three-year period of no submissions.
This period marked the nadir of World Court activity in peacetime.
Because this period of inactivity came during the most intense period of
Cold War hostilities, following the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, it
seems reasonable to argue that the Cold War had as significant an impact
on the court as did the open hostilities of World War lI.
During the remainder of I.C.J. II, the court experienced somewhat
more frequent submissions (a total of eleven - an average of still less than
one per year), but there were also four instances of outright defiance of the
court's compulsory jurisdiction during this time.16 There is no equivalent
period of defiance during the history of the P.C.I.J." By the time I.C.J. II
ended in 1985 and following the United States defiance of the court in the
Nicaragua case," the outlook for the future of international adjudication
looked quite bleak. There was little to portend the upsurge in the court's
business that emerged in the following period, 1986 to the present.
33. Interestingly, Belgium was involved in three of the four cases as the applicant state. See
Borchgrave (Belg. v. Spain), 1937 P.C.I.J. (ser. C) No. 83 (May 13); Electricity Company of
Sofia and Bulgaria (BeIg. v. Bulg.), 1939 P.C.I.J. (ser. C) No. 88 (Mo. Day); Soci6ti
Commerciale de Belgique (Beig. v. Greece), 1938 P.C.I.J. (ser. C) No. 87 (May 4). The other
submission was by Estonia, Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway (Est. v. Lith.), 1937 P.C.I.J. (ser. C)
No. 86 (Oct. 25).
34. BRUNE, supra note 20, at 738.
35. The representative of Bulgaria failed to appear in the Electricity Co. of Sofia and
Bulgaria case, but he was unable to attend due to the outbreak of the war. Electricity Co. of Sofia
and Bulgaria (Beig. v. Bulg.), 1939 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 77 (Apr. 4).
36. See Scott & Csajko, supra note 10, at 377 n.2.
37. For a full discussion of comparisons of defiance of compulsory jurisdiction on the
P.C.1.J. and I.C.J., see Scott & Csajko, supra note 10.
38. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
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IV. THE CONTEMPORARY COURT - I.C.J. III
A. Compulsory Jurisdiction - The Optional Clause.
Several things stand out about the court's activity in the period
from 1986 to the present. The first and most prominent differentiation
from the preceding period is the lack of defiance by states in cases brought
unilaterally under the court's compulsory jurisdiction as conferred by
article 36 (2) of the I.C.J. Statute.19 So far, during this most recent period
of court activity, seven cases have been brought under the optional
clause.'* As yet, none of these cases has resulted in any defiance of the
court's jurisdiction." While this might seem to be encouraging for the
institution of compulsory jurisdiction under the optional clause, a closer
look at the cases reveals that we should be cautious about inferring too
much about the power of compulsory jurisdiction based on these cases.
In order to determine the importance of compulsory jurisdiction in
bringing certain states before the court, we will rely on an earlier analysis
of compulsory jurisdiction cases.'2 To analyze the effect of compulsory
jurisdiction on the outcome of I.C.J. cases, the universe of optional clause
cases can be divided into four categories: Category I consists of cases
wherein the respondent state made no preliminary objections; Category II
consists of cases wherein there were preliminary objections that were
upheld by the court; Category III is made up of cases in which the
preliminary objections were overruled by the court, but where the decision
on the merits supported the respondent state's submissions; and finally,
39. Declaration Recognizing as Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice under art. 36, para. 2 of the Statute of the Court, supra note 31.
40. The seven cases brought under article 36(2) of the Statute of the I.C.J. are as follows:
Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Den. v. Nor.), 1993
I.C.J. 38 (June 12); Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.), 1992 I.C.J. 240 (June
26); Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Sen.), 1991 I.C.J. 53 (Nov. 12); East
Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1993 I.C.J. 32 (May 19); East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995, I.C.J.
Communiqu6 No. 95/19bis (June 30); Passage Through the Great Belt (Fin. v. Den.), 1992
I.C.J. 348 (Sept. 10); Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon
v. Nig.), 1994 I.C.J. 105 (June 16); Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Can.), 1995 I.C.J. 87 (May
2).
Although article 36(2) was used as a basis for the court's jurisdiction in Nicaragua's
submission against Honduras, the court found its jurisdiction in article XXXI of the Pact of
Bogota. Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicar. v. Hond.), 1988 I.C.J. 69 (Dec. 20).
We have therefore not counted this case as an optional clause case. Declaration Recognizing as
Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice under art. 36, para. 2 of the Statute
of the Court, supra note 31.
41. There are still two cases pending, Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and
Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nig.), 1994 I.C.J. 105 (June 16), and Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v.
Can.), 1995 I.C.J. 87 (May 2).
42. Scott & Carr, supra note 8, at 60; Scott & Csajko, supra note 10, at 378.
[Vol. 3: 1
1996]
Category IV includes cases wherein the court upheld the applicant state's
case on both objections and merits."1
From this categorization of compulsory jurisdiction cases under
article 36(2), it should be evident that compulsory jurisdiction does little to
enhance the court's role in Category I cases, which probably would have
been submitted to the court eventually even without compulsory
jurisdiction." In other words, there seems to be a willingness on the part
of the respondent states to participate in these cases which is implied by
the lack of preliminary objections. Category I cases are hard to distinguish
from joint submissions in terms of the disputant states' willingness to
conceptualize their dispute in legal terms.,,
Category II cases also do not reveal much about a state's
willingness to be bound by the court's decision because in these cases the
court simply finds it lacks jurisdiction.46 The respondent state, then, is
never really forced to make what might be a difficult choice between short-
term self-interest and the longer term interest of being seen as a law-
abiding state. Thus, only Category III and IV cases provide a test of
states' willingness to abide by the court's compulsory jurisdiction. 4
Although our earlier analysis was of completed cases, and although two of
the cases in the present period are still pending, we nonetheless think this
categorization helpful in providing some perspective on this issue.
Of the seven cases brought under the optional clause during this
latest period, three had no preliminary objections and thus fall under
Category I." In the Maritime Delimitation case49 between Denmark and
Norway, the court decided in favor of the respondent, Norway. Despite
negotiations since 1980, Denmark contended it had not been possible to
find a solution to a dispute concerning delimitation off Denmark and
Norway's fishing zones and continental shelf areas in the waters between
the East Coast of Greenland and the Norwegian Island of Jan Mayan.
Denmark initiated proceedings against Norway, asking the court to
43. Scott & Csajko, supra note 10, at 378.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 379-81.
46. Id. at 378.
47. Id.
48. Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Sen.), 1991 I.C.J. 53 (Nov. 12);
Passage Through the Great Belt (Fin. v. Den.), 1992 I.C.J. 348 (Sept. 10); Maritime
Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Den. v. Nor.), 1993 I.C.J. 38 (June
14).
49. Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Den. v. Nor.),
1993 I.C.J. 38 (June 14).
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adjudge and declare the parties' fishing zones and continental shelf areas.
Norway lodged no preliminary objections to the court's jurisdiction. The
court delivered a judgment which draws a delimitation line that divides the
continental shelf and fishery zones of the Kingdom of Denmark and the
Kingdom of Norway.?
Similarly, without preliminary objections, the Arbitral Award
case"' was submitted to the court by Guinea-Bissau against Senegal on the
basis of Article 36(2) of the Statute of the court.12 This dispute arose over
the delimitation of maritime boundaries which had been fixed in 1960 by
an agreement between Portugal and France" and reaffirmed by an
arbitration tribunal in 1989.34 Before the I.C.J., Guinea-Bissau claimed
that the arbitral award of July 31, 1989, should be declared inexistent.
Guinea-Bissau also claimed that Senegal was not justified in seeking
application of the null and void award." The court unanimously rejected
Guinea-Bissau's submission and found the award valid and binding. The
parties are thus bound by the earlier arbitration decision.'
In each of the cases above, the states involved seemed to be willing
to conceptualize their dispute in legal terms. Moreover, since the cases
were decided in favor of the respondents, there is little test of whether this
willingness to pursue legal remedies initially would have continued in the
face of a negative court decision. There is no reason to suppose it would
not. Past Category I cases have not resulted in defiance of the court's
decisions."
The third case in which there were no preliminary objections to the
court's jurisdiction under article 36(2)" is the case between Finland and
Denmark, Passage through the Great Belt.9 As a result of an agreement
reached between the two parties, the case was discontinued at the request
of Finland.w0 Once again, it seems that the parties were originally willing
50. Id. at 46-47, paras. 91-92.
51. Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Sen.), 1991 I.C.J. 53 (Nov. 12).
52. Id. at 55.
53. Id. at 57.
54. Id. at 59-61.
55. Id. at 56.
56. Id. at 75-76.
57. Scott & Carr, supra note 8, at 61-62; Scott & Csajko, supra note 10, at 379-81.
58. Supra note 31.
59. Passage Through the Great Belt (Fin. v. Den.), 1991 l.C.J. 12 (July 29).
60. Passage Through the Great Belt (Fin. v. Den.), 1992 i.C.J. 348 (Sept. 10).
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to conceptualize their dispute in legal terms. In this instance, however, the
lure of a political settlement apparently won out over a judicial remedy."
In the first optional clause case in which there were preliminary
objections, the court rejected those objections that were based upon
jurisdictional grounds. In Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru,'2 Australia
lodged six preliminary objections to the court's jurisdiction, only the first
of which applied directly to article 36(2).61 Australia also lodged a seventh
objection that pertained more to the scope of the subject matter within the
case." While the court rejected the objections based upon jurisdiction, it
upheld Australia's objection which excluded the overseas assets of the
British Phosphate Commissioners from consideration in the instant case.6'
While the court found that it had jurisdiction based upon the two parties'
acceptance of the optional clause,* it excluded the part of Nauru's claim
that seemingly provided the raison d'etre for its case." Perhaps as a result
of that exclusion, during the following year the parties entered into
negotiations that resulted in an agreement between them,'6 and Nauru
requested a discontinuance of the case.61 With such a result, it is difficult
to conclude much about the role played by compulsory jurisdiction in this
case.
The second case in which there were preliminary objections to the
court's jurisdiction was the East Timor case'9 between Portugal and
Australia, wherein, "Portugal referred, in its application, to the
61. The settlement of the dispute was no doubt aided by Denmark's willingness to pay to
Finland the sum of 90 million Danish kroner. Passage Through the Great Belt (Fin. V. Den.),
1992 I.C.J. 348 (Sept. 10); International Court of Justice: Order Discontinuing the Proceedings
in Case Concerning Passage Through the Great Belt (Fin. v. Den.), 32 I.L.M. 101, 103 (1993).
This resulted in Finland's agreement to withdraw the case.
62. Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.), 1992 I.C.J. 240 (June 26).
63. Australia's preliminary objection was based upon its reservation to its acceptance of the
optional clause deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations on March 17, 1975.
Id. The court, by a vote of nine votes to four, found that it had jurisdiction on the basis of article
36(2). Id. at 269. The Australian reservation reads, "The Government of Australia further
declares that this declaration does not apply to any dispute in regard to which the parties thereto
have agreed or shall agree to have recourse to some other method of peaceful settlement."
Austr., 1990-1991 I.C.J.Y.B. 69 (Mar. 13, 1975).
64. Australia's seventh objection stated, inter alia, "that Nauru's claim concerning the
overseas assets of the British Phosphate Commissioners is inadmissible and that the Court has no
jurisdiction in relation to that claim, on the grounds that: the claim is a new one .... " Certain
Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.), 1992 I.C.J. 240, 264 (June 26).
65. Id. at 268.
66. d. at 268-69.
67. Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.), 1993 I.C.J. 322 (Sept. 13).
68. Id.
69. East Timor (Port. v. Austi.), 1991-1992 I.C.J.Y.B. 179 (May 3, 1991).
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Declarations made by the two States under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the
Statute of the Court." 0 In this case, Portugal claimed that Australia's 1989
agreement with Indonesia, "relating to the exploration and exploitation of
the continental shelf in the area of the 'Timor Gap,'. . . had caused
particularly serious legal and moral damage to the people of East Timor
and to Portugal. ... ", Further, Portugal claimed material damage if the
exploitation of hydrocarbon resources should begin.71
Australia's principal objection in this case was that the court could
not adjudicate any dispute over the treaty in question without first
determining the lawfulness of Indonesia's entry into and continued
presence in East Timor. Moreover, the court could not do so without the
consent of Indonesia since Indonesia is not a party to the optional clause.
The court, by a vote of ten to five, upheld Australia's principal objection."
This case then falls under Category II and offers little on the impact of
compulsory jurisdiction.
In the Land and Maritime Boundary case between Cameroon and
Nigeria,4 preliminary objections concerning the jurisdiction of the court
and the admissibility of the claims by Cameroon were filed by Nigeria on
December 13, 1995.11 The respondent, however, had appointed an ad hoc
judge to the court, apparently indicating its willingness to participate in the
case. This is another serious case involving open hostilities over land and
maritime delimitation, but one in which the parties seem willing to seek a
judicial settlement. On March 15, 1996, at the request of Cameroon and
following hearings on the matter, the court issued an order on provisional
measures designed to stop the most recent outbreak of fighting in this
dispute .16
On March 28, 1995, Spain instituted proceedings against Canada"




73. East Timor (Port. v. Austi.), I.C.J. Communiqud No. 95/19bis, June 30, 1995.
74. Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nig.),
1994 I.C.J. 105 (June 16).
75. Id.; Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nig.),
I.C.J. Communiqu6 No. 96/1, Jan. 11, 1996.
76. Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nig.),
I.C.J. Communiqu6 No. 96/13, Mar. 15, 1996.
77. Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Can.), 1995 1.C.J. 87 (May 2).
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court's jurisdiction.7" This dispute arose generally over provisions of the
Canadian Coastal Fisheries Protection Act as amended on May 12, 1994,19
and specifically over the boarding on the high seas of a fishing boat flying
the Spanish flag." Canada believes that the court does not have
jurisdiction over this matter because of the reservation to their acceptance
of the optional clause which excludes "disputes arising out of or
concerning conservation and management measures taken by Canada with
respect to vessels fishing in the [North Atlantic Fisheries Organization]
Regulatory Area . . .and the enforcement of such measures."" As of this
writing the parties have not yet submitted their written arguments
addressing the court's jurisdiction. It is thus too early to make any
judgment on the impact of this case on the institution of compulsory
jurisdiction.
Review of optional clause cases suggests that there is little reason
to be either optimistic or pessimistic about the success of the court's
compulsory jurisdiction based on the optional clause. It would seem that
there is no reason to differ with our earlier analyses of the P.C.LJ. and
I.C.J. experiences under the optional clause." That is, when states are
willing to conceptualize their disputes in legal terms, they will do so, and
they will follow through with adherence to the decisions of the court. This
seems true with or without compulsory jurisdiction under article 36(2)."
There is nothing in the present record to suggest, however, that if a state
found it in its own best interest to defy compulsory jurisdiction that it
would not. Moreover, the record of state defiance in I.C.J. II dramatically
supports this conclusion. On the whole then, for the present period, the
evidence about compulsory jurisdiction under the optional clause is
inconclusive. We should, however, add one qualifier to this.
78. Peter H.F. Bekker, Recent Developments in the World Court, AM. SOC. INT'L L.
NEWSL., June-Aug. 1995, at 4; Maritime Delimination and Territorial Questions between Qatar
and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahr.), I.C.J. Communiqut No. 95/11, Mar. 29, 1995; Fisheries
Jursdiction (Spain v. Can.), IC.J. Communiqu6 No. 95/12, May 2, 1995.
79. Maritime Delimination and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v.
Bahr.), I.C.J. Communiqu6 No. 95/11, Mar. 29, 1995; see also Bekker, supra note 78, at 4.
80. Id.
81. Bekker, supra note 78, at 4.
82. Scott & Carr, supra note 8, at 74-76; Scott & Csajko, supra note 10, at 391-92. But
see RENATA SZAFARZ, THE COMPULSORY JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE (1993).
83. Declaration Recognizing as Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice under art. 36, para. 2 of the Statute of the Court, supra note 31.
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One of the most recent cases brought under the optional clause,
Cameroon v. Nigeria," has the potential to provide some evidence in
support of the effectiveness of the court's compulsory jurisdiction. There
are several elements about this case that have been associated in the past
with instances of defiance. There have been open hostilities in this
particular dispute (a security issue), there is a serious economic matter at
stake, it is a dispute about border and maritime delimitations," and the
power differential between the two states is large. 6  In light of these
factors, this dispute, should it be resolved against the respondent, Nigeria,
would be a serious test of a commitment to lawfulness in the post-Cold
War period. The preliminary signs are hopeful. Nigeria recognized the
compulsory jurisdiction of the court under article 36(2) in 1965.with no
reservations." There was a Nigerian judge on the court continuously from
1967 until 1994,u thus establishing Nigerian participation in the
international legal process soon after its independence.8 ' Furthermore,
Nigeria has thus far indicated a willingness to participate in this case by
the appointment of an ad hoc judge.0 It has also indicated its willingness
to abide by the court's order of provisional measures issued on March 15,
1996."1
B. Compromissory Clauses
We now turn to compulsory jurisdiction granted to the court under
compromissory clauses.Y During this period of I.C.J. activity there have
been several cases submitted to the court on the basis of compromissory
clauses in treaties. Our analysis of these cases, however, will necessarily
84. Cameroon brings a case against Nigeria, I.C.J. Communiqu6 94/12, Mar. 30, 1994.
85. "In the Application Cameroon refers to 'an aggression by the Federal Republic of
Nigeria, whose troops are occupying several Cameroonian localities on the Bakassi peninsula,'
resulting 'in great prejudice to the Republic of Cameroon.'" Id.
86. Scott & Csajko found that, "the best indicator of likely defiance seems to be 'power
differential' since most of the recent instances of defiance have occurred between states of great
power disparity." Scott & Csajko, supra note 10, at 392.
87. Nigeria, 1990-1991 I.C.J.Y.B. 93-94 (Aug. 14, 1965).
88. The Nigerian Judges were C.D. Onyeama, 1967-1976, and T.O. Elias, 1976-1994.
89. Nigeria achieved independence within the Commonwealth on October 1, 1960.
90. "The Federal Republic of Nigeria notified the Court of its intention to choose Mr. Bola
Ajibola to sit as judge ad hoc in the case." Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and
Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nig.), 1994 I.C.J. 106 (June 16).
91. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (broadcast Mar. 18, 1996).
92. For an excellent discussion of Compromissoy Clauses and I.C.J. jurisdiction see
Jonathan 1. Charney, Compromissory Clauses and The Jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 855 (1987).
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be limited since at the time of this writing only one of these cases had
come to judgment.93 Two cases were discontinued at the parties' request,"
and the remaining cases were still pending.
The first of the compromissory clause cases was between
Nicaragua and Honduras." Though Nicaragua presented two bases for the
court's jurisdiction, including Article 36(2) of the Statute, the court found
its jurisdiction in article XXXI of the Pact of Bogota." Beyond a judgment
on the preliminary objections, however, this case never came to judgment
on its merits. Though the judgment on the preliminary objections was
given on December 20, 1988," the case continued for the next three and
one half years because of extensions requested by the parties.'8 These
extensions were brought about because the parties were, "in the context of
arrangements aimed at achieving an extra-judicial settlement of the dispute
... "" As a result of these negotiations, Nicaragua requested on May 11,
1992, that the court discontinue the proceedings.4
The effect of the court's compulsory jurisdiction in this case may
have been to cause the parties to seek a settlement they otherwise might
not have sought. That is, once faced with the prospect of going to court,
Honduras may have been more willing to settle the dispute in a process
over which it had some control (negotiation) rather than risk a judicial
settlement over which it had no control. Once the court ruled against the
Honduran preliminary objections and found it had jurisdiction, the only
other alternatives to negotiation for Honduras were to proceed with the
unwanted litigation or to defy the court. The latter does not seem to be a
prospect that most states undertake lightly, especially when jurisdiction is
based upon a compromissory clause.'0'
The second case submitted 'to the court on the basis of a
compromissory clause was Elettronica Sicula S. p. A. (ELSI),'l between
93. Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15 (July 20).
)4. Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicar. v. Hond.), 1988 1.C.J. 69 (Dec. 20).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 107.
97. Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicar. v. Hond.), 1988 I.C.J. 69 (Dec. 20).
98. Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicar. v. Hond.), 1992 I.C.J. 222, 223 (May
27).
99. Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicar. v. Hond.), 1989 1.C.J. 174, 175 (Dec.
14).
100. Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicar. v. Hond.), 1992 I.C.J. 222, 223 (May
27).
101. Scott & Carr, supra note 8, at 67.
102. Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 .C.J. 15 (July 20).
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the United States and Italy. The court's jurisdiction was based on the
dispute settlement clause in the Treaty of Friendship and Commerce and
Navigation between the United States and Italy. °3 Though this was a
unilateral application by the United States, there was no objection to the
court's jurisdiction by the respondent state.'0' In fact, the -response of Italy
in accepting the United States proposal was so quick that the case has the
look of a joint submission.' 0 A particularly interesting feature of this case
is that it was the first (and so far the only) case heard in chambers which
was submitted unilaterally on the basis of a compromissory clause.'10
The third case submitted to the court based upon its jurisdiction
conferred by treaty is the Aerial Incident case"'° between Iran and the
United States. This case is a quintessential example of protracted
adjudication that has ended in a negotiated settlement. It arose from the
destruction of an Iranian aircraft and the killing of its 290 passengers and
crew on July 3, 1988, and over the interpretation and applicability of the
1944 Convention on International Civil Aviation 0' and the 1971
Convention and Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil
Aviation.'0 ' Not only did the United States request extended time limits for
filing its Memorial prior to lodging preliminary objections, but it also
petitioned the court for more time to prepare its objections. At the time of
this writing, the case, having been extended several times, has been
discontinued at the request of the parties who have negotiated "an
agreement in full and final settlement of all disputes, differences, claims,
counterclaims and matters directly or indirectly raised by or capable of
103. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Feb. 2, 1948, U.S.-Italy, arts. 16,
63 Stat. 2255 (entered into force July 26, 1949).
104. It is common ground between the Parties that the court has jurisdiction in the
present case, under Article 36, paragraph 1 of its Statute, and Article XXVI of the
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce of its Statute, and Article XXVI of the Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, of 2 June 1948 ('the FCN Treaty'), between
Italy and the United States ....
Elettronica Sicula S.P.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15, 41 (July 20).
105. The United States submitted its application and request that the case be heard in
chambers to the court on February 6, 1987, and the Italian response accepting the United States
proposal was submitted to the court by telegram on February 13, 1987. Id. at 17-18.
106. Highet, supra note 5, at 647 n. 11.
107. Aerial Incident of 3 July 1988 (Iran v. U.S.), 1989 I.C.J. 132 (Dec. 13).
108. Convention On International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15
U.N.T.S. 215.
109. Suppression Of Unlawful Acts Against The Safety Of Civil Aviation. Sept. 23, 1971,
24 U.S.T. 564, 974 U.N.T.S. 178.
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arising out of, or directly or indirectly related to or connected with, this
case. "
There have been two cases submitted to the court by unilateral
application based upon earlier agreements to submit the dispute to the
court failing a resolution by other means. '"
In the Territorial Dispute between Libya and Chad,'- . the court
took its jurisdiction from a special agreement between the two parties"'
that conferred jurisdiction on the court with respect to the settlement of the
territorial dispute between them. Article 1 of the agreement stated, "The
two parties undertake to settle their territorial dispute first by all political
means, including conciliation, within one year, unless the Chiefs of State
decide upon another time period.""' Article 2 goes on to state, inter alia
"[i]n the absence of a political settlement of their territorial dispute, the
two parties undertake: A) to submit the dispute for judgment by the
International court of Justice."' This was a case of high salience since it
involved a territorial dispute and there had been armed hostilities over the
area in question. Throughout the proceedings both parties seemed willing
to abide by the court's judgment and, following the court's judgment,
negotiated an agreement on the implementation of the judgment."6 Though
there is some chance that this case might have ended in defiance of the
court's judgment, this probability was lessened considerably by the court's
decision in favor of the respondent.
In Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar
and Bahrain,"' Qatar brought a unilateral application to the court based
upon earlier agreements between the two parties. Bahrain objected to the
court's jurisdiction, but the court in its decision dated February 15, 1995,
110. Aerial Incident of 3 July (Iran v. U.S.), I.C.J. Communique No. 96/6, Feb. 23, 1996.
111. The two cases are: Territorial Dispute (Libya v. Chad), 1994 I.C.J. 4 (Feb. 3); and
Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Quatar and Bahrain, 1994 I.C.J. 112
(July 1).
112. Territorial Dispute (Libya v, Chad), 1994 I.C.J. 4 (Feb. 3).
113. Id.
114. Agreement On The Peaceful Settlement Of The Territorial Dispute Between The
Republic Of Chad and Libya, Aug. 31, 1989, Chad-Libya, 29 I.L.M. 15, 16 (1990).
115. Id. at 16.
116. Agreement Between The Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and The
Republic Of Chad Concerning The Practical Modalities For The Implementation Of The
Judgement Delivered By The International Court Of Justice On Feb. 3, 1994, Apr. 4, 1994,
Chad-Libyan Ardo Jarrahirya, U.N. Doc. S/1994/402 (1994).
117. Maritime Delimitations and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v.
Bahr.), I.C.J. Communique No. 95/11, May 1. 1995.
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held that it had jurisdiction over the dispute."' It also found the application
of Qatar admissible and that it was seised of the whole dispute."19 At the
time of this writing the court had extended the timelimit for the filing of
memorials on the merits of the case to September 30, 1996.'2
During I.C.J. III then, the court has had a good record on
compulsory jurisdiction cases brought under compromissory clauses. This
is not unexpected. As we have noted above, states seem more compelled
to carry through with cases brought under compromissory clauses than
under the optional clause. This is probably because the treaty relationship
is held to be more important to them than the optional clause. In other
words, the treaty creates a social relationship between the parties, based on
their mutual self-interest, that engenders cooperative behavior in dispute
settlement procedures. This relationship is either lacking or much weaker
among parties to the optional clause.
C. Chambers
I.C.J. III has seen three cases decided in chambers.'' This
increased reliance upon chambers following the 1984 case, Gulf of
Maine,22 was the cause of some concern among international law scholars
and practitioners.' While there may be some genuine issues to be raised
about over-reliance upon the institution of chambers,1 it may also increase
states' willingness to submit disputes to the court. This was, after all, the
main reason behind the change in the 1978 edition of the Rules of the
118. Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v.
Bahr.), 1994 I.C.J. 112 (July 1).
119. Id.
120. Maritime Delimitations and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar'v.
Bahr.), I.C.J. Communiqud No. 96/2, Feb. 5, 1996.
121. Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 i.C.J. 554 (Dec. 22); Elettronica Siclua
S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy). 89 I.C.J. 15 (July 20); Land, Island And Maritime Frontier
Dispute (El Sal./Hond.: Nicar. intervening), 1992 I.C.J. 351 (Sept. 11).
122. Delimitation Of The Maritime Boundary In The Gulf Of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.),
1984 I.C.J. 246 (Oct. 12).
123. See Highet, supra note 5, at 649. Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal.
v. Hond.), 1990 I.C.J. 3, 18 (Feb. 28) (dissenting opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen). But see
Jennings, supra note 5, at 496-97.
124. Jennings raises a concern over the work load that chambers places on the Court.
The members of a chamber inevitably remain also members of the full court. If,
therefore, a chamber of the Court is faced with a very considerable task - as the
Chambers were in the Gulf of Maine case, and particularly in the Land, Island and
Maritime Frontier case - it is practically unavoidable that the full Court should mark
time in order to permit the members of the Chamber to perform their task.
Jennings, supra note 5, at 496.
(Vol. 3:1
1996]
Court designed to make the institution of chambers more accessible to
disputants.1' Moreover, if we view the purpose of the court as being the
settlement of legal disputes, then successful methods of dispute resolution,
including chambers, should be encouraged. During a period of extreme
under-use of the court, facilitating chambers seemed a good idea. In a
period of peak court activity it may seem less so. Nonetheless, chambers
has proven successful in resolving some serious disputes. As Judge
Jennings points out, "Clearly it is not the lesser disputes where parties
have preferred a chamber.""'
Two very serious cases involving territorial disputes were settled
in chambers. The first was the Frontier Dispute case' 2 between Burkina
Faso and Mali, submitted to the court by special agreement between the
two parties. This case, referred to as a "dangerous dispute" by Judge
Jennings,' 2 involved armed hostilities in the border region between the two
states.2 9 From indicated provisional measures through final judgment the
court played a very successful role in the resolution of this dispute. By the
time of the judgment both sides had agreed to withdraw their troops from
the disputed area and to return to their respective territories.,"
The second territorial dispute settled in Chambers during I.C.J. III
was Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/ Honduras:
Nicaragua intervening)."' This very complicated case consumed two
straight months of hearings and was "the longest single case since the ill-
fated 'merits' phase of the South West Africa cases in 1965. " "12 Moreover,
this case, according to Highet, was "really four, if not five, cases of
normal size and shape rolled into one . . . . "" Judge Jose Sette-Camara,
presiding judge of the chamber, called the case the most complicated in the
history of the court.,' Indeed, the issues were complex and involved open
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 L.C.J. 554 (Dec. 22).
128. Id.
129. Jennings, supra note 5, at 496.
130. Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 L.C.J. 554 (Dec. 22).
131. Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal./Hond.: Nicar. intervening), 1992
I.C.J. 351 (Sept. 11).
132. Highet, supra note 5, at 648. South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.),
Second Phase, 1966 I.C.J. 6 (July 18), cited in Highet, supra note 5.
133. Highet, supra note 5, at 648.
134. World Court Settles a Latin Border Dispute, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1992, at AlO.
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conflict between the parties prior to the litigation.'" Nonetheless, thecourt
was able to resolve this highly explosive territorial dispute in a. chamber of
five judges."' The decision, which favored Honduras, was difficult for El
Salvador for several reasons, but they apparently will abide by the terms of
the court's judgment."'
The third case brought before chambers involved economic issues.
In the 1987 ELSI Case,", the United States claimed that Italy had violated
their bilateral 1948 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation,"'
and the Supplementary Agreement'40 by executing an unjustified
involuntary bankruptcy of an Italian company."' The court found for the
respondent and held that the Government of Italy was not responsible to
pay compensation to the United States. ,,2
D. Discontinued Cases
One interesting development during I.C.J. III is the number of
cases which have been discontinued as a result of states deciding to settle
their disputes prior to a judgment by the court. This current upswing is
reminiscent of earlier terminations by parties under the auspices of the
Permanent Court of International Justice. "3 During the summer of 1992,
Denmark and Finland negotiated a settlement of their 1991 dispute
Concerning Passage through the Great Belt.'" Both sides felt that their bi-
lateral relations had suffered as a result of the conflict, and on September
3, 1992, Denmark agreed to pay ninety million Danish kroner if Finland
would agree to withdraw its application."'
135. The dispute over the territory in question was more than two centuries old and the
violence erupted in the so-called soccer war in 1969. Shirley Christian, In Land Lost To
Honduras, Hearts Are Holdouts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1992, at A4.
136. The judges in the chamber were: Sir Robert Jennings (Pres. of the court), Sigeru Oda
(Vice Pres. of the court), Jose Sette-Camara (Presiding over the chamber), Santiago Torres
BernArdez (Judge ad hoc for Hond.), and Nicolds Valticos (Judge ad hoc for El Sal.). Land,
Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal./Hond.: Nicar. intervening), 1992 I.C.J. 351 (Sept.
11).
137. Id. See also Christian, supra note 135, at 4.
138. Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 41 (July 20).
139. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, supra note 103.
140. Agreement Supplementing the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation,
Protocol, Feb. 2, 1948, U.S.-Italy, 12 U.S.T. 131.
141. Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 IC.J. 15 (July 20).
142. Id. at 70.
143. Scott & Csajko, supra note 10, at 385-86.
144. Passage Through the Great Belt (Fin. v. Den.), 1992 I.C.J. 348 (Sept. 10).
145. Passage Through the Great Belt (Fin. v. Den.), 32 I.L.M. 101, 103 (1993).
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In the Nicaragua case,'" despite the fact that on June 27, 1986, the
court delivered a judgment against the United States, as of September 7,
1987, no agreement had been reached between the parties as to the form
and amount of the adjudged reparations. In view of this lack of progress,
Nicaragua requested that the I.C.J. make the necessary orders for further
review of the case. However, by September 1991 Nicaragua informed the
court that they did not wish to continue with the proceedings and
renounced all further rights in the case. Consequently, the court delivered
an Order of Discontinuance, removing the dispute from its docket, on
September 26, 1991 .'4
Nicaragua also requested discontinuance of its claim against the
Government of Honduras in the 1986 Border and Transborder Armed
Actions.,' Nicaragua further announced "that the Parties had reached an
out-of-court agreement aimed at enhancing their good neighborly relations.
"149
Similarly, in Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru between Nauru
and Australia," regarding the legal entitlement to the Australian allocation
of overseas assets of the British Phosphate Commissioners, the parties
reached an agreement outside the court and agreed to terminate their case.
This came after the court's judgment on Australia's preliminary objections,
but prior to a judgment on merits."'
The most recent case to be discontinued as a result of an amicable
settlement between the parties is the Aerial Incident case '"2 between Iran
and the United States."3 After several extensions of time limits granted by
the court, the parties reached a final settlement. The length of time
allowed by the court at the request of the parties no doubt aided the ability
of the parties to reach a negotiated settlement.
146. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
147. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1991
I.C.J. 47, 48 (Sept. 26).
148. Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicar. v. Hond.), 1992 I.C.J. 222 (May 27).
149. Id
150. Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.), 1993 I.C.J. 322 (Sept. 13).
151. Id. at 323.
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These cases support the contention that states will consider the
court as one of several alternatives for dispute settlement.'11 Although
discontinuances represent a solution absent adjudication, in these cases the
court seems to have acted as a catalyst for a negotiated settlement. As
indicated, terminated cases represent a sincere "desire for dispute
settlement rather than a specifically judicial resolution."",
E. Other Cases
There are several other cases not discussed above which are still
pending. Although they cannot be included in our analysis, they deserve
mention because of the importance of their subject matter. In Oil
Platforms," 6 Iran and the United States requested' an extension of time
limits prior to the filing of preliminary objections by the respondent.'"'
This case was brought by Iran against the United States over the
destruction of oil platforms allegedly caused by United States troops during
the Iran-Iraq War in 1987 and 1988.' Hearings on the preliminary
objections are set to open on September 16, 1996.59
Another lengthy proceeding involves Questions of Interpretation
and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial
Incident at Lockerbie. 11 This case arose over incidents which followed the
destruction of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland on December
21, 1988. The United States and the United Kingdom subsequently
indicted two Libyan nationals for bombing the aircraft, and the U.N.
Security Council demanded their extradition from Libya. The United
States and the United Kingdom also instituted economic boycotts against
Libya. Libya claimed that both states violated international law by their
actions which were contrary to the provisions of the Montreal
Convention' which governs aviation matters among the parties. Libya
154. For a discussion of the role of the court as a bargaining agent see William Coplin,
The World Court in the International Bargaining Process, in THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM
AND ITS FUNCTIONS 317 (R. Gregg & M. Barkun eds., 1968).
155. Scott & Csajko, supra note 10, at 385.
156. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U. S.), 1994 I.C.J. 3 (Jan. 18).
157. Id.
158. See Iran Sues U.S. Over Gulf Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1992, at A6.
159. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), I.C.J. Communique No. 96/4, Feb. 6, 1996.
160. Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising
from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.), 1992 I.C.J. 114 (Apr. 14); Questions of
Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident
at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. U.K.), 1992 I.C.J. 3 (Apr. 14).
161. Montreal Convention for the Suspension of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil
Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, 974 U.N.T.S. 178.
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initially asked the court to grant them interim measures of protection from
the actions of the United States and the United Kingdom, but these
measures were denied by the court. 6 2 At the time of this writing, the case
was proceeding on its merits phase.
In addition to cases jointly submitted by the parties to chambers,
there has been only one other joint submission during I.C.J. III. In
Gabikovo-Nagymaros Project,'"6 Hungary and Slovakia jointly brought to
court a dispute over the implementation and the termination by Hungary of
the Treaty on the Construction and Operation of the Gabikovo-Nagymaros
Barrage System, signed in Budapest on September 16, 1977.'" This case,
which arose over the building of a dam on the Danube, is of particular
interest involving both treaty law questions, and international
environmental law questions.163 At the time of this writing, the case was in
the stage of written pleadings.
In Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,'" there were two applications for
provisional measures made by Bosnia and Herzegovina against
Yugoslavia. The court ordered provisional measures in the first
application but found itself unable to order further provisional measures in
the second because of jurisdictional questions.'67 At the time of this writing
Yugoslavia has filed preliminary objections in this case, and the court has
fixed November 14, 1995, for the filing of a written statement by Bosnia
162. Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising
from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. U.S.), 1992 I.C.J. 114 (Apr.
14).
163. Gabikovo -Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), 1993 I.C.J. 319 (July 14).
164. Id.
165. See Dispute Over Danube Dam Threatens Hungarian Wetlands, N.Y. TIMES, July 11,
1993, at AIO.
166. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo.; Serbia & Montenegro), 1993 I.C.J. 325 (Sept. 13).
167. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo.; Serbia & Montenegro), 1993 I.C.J. 3 (Apr. 8); Application
of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v.
Yugo.; Serbia & Montenegro), 1993 I.C.J. 325 (Sept. 13). See also Jennings, supra note 5, at
502.
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and Herzegovina concerning these preliminary objections.- Hearings on
the preliminary objections opened on April 29, 1996.69
V. CONCLUSION
The results of cases submitted during the current period of the
I.C.J. is encouraging for international adjudication. Nonetheless, viewing
the current period as a trend in the lawful settlement of international
disputes should be approached with cautious optimism; there is some
probability that it might merely be another cycle of increased court
activity. Our comparisons of the immediate post-Cold War court (I.C.J.
III), with the court in the immediate post-World War periods (P.C.I.J. I
and I.C.J. I), indicate a similar willingness of states to rely on international
adjudication to resolve their disputes in periods following serious
international disruptions.
The I.C.J. in the current period has been used by states in a
variety of ways to resolve their disputes. The states have used it to gain
judicial settlement, and they have used it as an element in the international
bargaining process. This is evidenced by the number of cases which were
terminated because of solutions reached prior to judgment. This augers
well for international lawfulness and for the court. It is not necessary that
a dispute have a judicial resolution, only that it be settled. If the court can
play a role as a bargaining agent in the dispute settlement process, then it
has served a useful function.
A further encouraging sign is that states have not used the court
during I.C.J. III as a means merely for gaining political leverage against
each other, which happened often during I.C.J. 1, and particularly in the
cases of defiance during I.C.J. 11.110 Probably because of this, there have
been no instances in the current period of state defiance of the court's
authority. However, this deserves a cautionary note as well. In many of
the cases exhibiting elements which were present in earlier instances of
defiance, the cases were resolved in favor of the respondent state; thus
effectively removing any reason for the respondent state to defy the court.
Similarly, the court's compulsory jurisdiction has not been put to
any severe test. It has served in both optional clause jurisdiction and in
168. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo.; Serbia & Montenegro), I.C.J. Communique No. 95/21, July
19, 1995.
169. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo.; Serbia & Montenegro), I.C.J. Communique No. 96/3, Feb.
6, 1996.
170. See generally supra note 23.
[Vol. 3:1
19961
compromissory clause jurisdiction, when states seem predisposed toward
dispute settlement, and when the desired settlement is a legal one. While
there is no particular reason for pessimism over the compulsory
jurisdiction of the court, as there was during I.C.J. II, there is no
particular reason for extreme optimism either. The court has simply not
seen cases where one state is attempting to force another into litigation
through the use of the court's optional compulsory jurisdiction. Recent
cases certainly give no reason to try to increase the court's power of
compulsory jurisdiction. Compulsory jurisdiction works well enough in its
present optional form and would probably not work if attempts were made
to institute mandatory compulsory jurisdiction.
For reasons that may have to do with the end of the Cold War and
an accompanying sense of legal idealism, the current period of the I.C.J.
has been one wherein states have exhibited a concern for the lawful
settlement of disputes. Moreover, the disputes have been of high salience,
involving as they have, matters that have often been the subject of open
hostilities. In the matters presented before it, both in chambers and in the
full court, the court has been quite successful in performing its role of
dispute settlement. At this juncture there is no way of knowing whether the
current sense of lawfulness among states will outlive the post Cold War
period of legal idealism, or whether it will come to an end like those
periods of legalism which followed the two world wars. We can only be
hopeful that we are witnessing a trend toward international lawfulness and
not merely witnessing another cycle in the history of the World Court.
Scott
